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Case No. 940700-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant Richard Rodriguez relies on his 
opening brief and refers this Court to that brief for the 
statements of jurisdiction, issues, case, facts, and summary of 
the argument. Appellant replies to the State's brief as follows. 
Issues which are not addressed in this reply brief were 
adequately analyzed in Appellant's opening brief or do not 
require reply. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE. 
A. THE TRIAL JUDGE INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
THE OFFICER HAD A REASONABLE SUSPICION JUSTIFYING 
THE DETENTION. 
The State agrees that the trial judge correctly concluded 
that the officers made a "level II" detention of Rodriguez. 
State's brief at 8-9. 
The State is correct that this Court must review the 
totality of the circumstances in assessing whether the officer 
had a reasonable articulable suspicion which justified the 
detention. See State's brief at 13. Rodriguez recognizes this 
test throughout his opening brief. See, e.g., Appellant's 
opening brief at 13, 15, 16-18. By assessing the various factors 
which the trial court could have considered, Rodriguez pointed 
out that none of the factors supported a reasonable suspicion 
determination and that under the totality of circumstances, the 
officers did not have a reasonable suspicion to justify the 
detention. Appellant's opening brief at 13-18. 
In arguing that the officer had a reasonable suspicion to 
justify the detention of Rodriguez, the State relies on the 
production of a wad of bills as the crucial distinguishing factor 
which, under the totality of circumstances, tips the balance in 
favor of a reasonable suspicion. See State's brief at 20-22. A 
review of various cases involving detentions based on 
transactions or encounters in high drug areas demonstrates that a 
crucial factor for many courts appears to be whether the officer 
witnessed the actual exchange of money and drugs and not whether 
the officer observed money. See, e.g.. People v. Shaw, 596 
N.Y.S.2d 832, 833 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (cited by the State on 
page 23 of its brief) (officer witnessed exchange of object for 
cash in four separate transactions before detaining defendant); 
Com, v. Albino, 652 A.2d 953 (Pa. Super. 1995), rev'd, 664 A.2d 
84 (Pa. 1995)x (cited by the State on page 23 of its brief) 
1
 In its brief at 23, the State relies on the lower court 
decision in Albino. This decision was reversed by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court in Com. v. Albino, 664 A.2d 84 (Pa. 1995) 
("Albino II"). Hence, the facts in Albino were not sufficient to 
establish a reasonable suspicion despite the exchange. Albino II 
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(officer observed defendant hand objects to unknown female in 
exchange for cash). 
In the present case, Officer Dailey testified that he saw 
the individual in the tennis outfit pull out what the officer 
felt was a wad of money. The man then returned the money to his 
own pocket without giving it to Rodriguez. Rodriguez did not 
give the man anything. Hence, there was no exchange of money for 
something in this case, and the money which the officer observed 
was held by the other man. 
The facts in this case are similar to the facts in Gipson 
v. State, 537 So.2d 1081 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1989) where the 
officers did not see the exchange of drugs or money. See also 
State v. Ellington, 495 N.W.2d 915, 919 (Neb. 1993) (Ellington 
cites numerous cases for proposition that various "jurisdictions 
have collectively concluded that when an officer does not 
recognize or know an individual; is not acting on particularized 
information from a third party; does not observe an exchange of 
items or money between the individual and another person; does 
not observe any movement, gestures, or attempts by the individual 
to conceal or hide objects; does not observe the individual 
repeatedly approach vehicles in a similar pattern of activity; 
and does not suspect the individual of any other crime, the 
officer's mere observation of a pedestrian leaning into a window 
of a stopped vehicle in a high-crime area and then walking away 
upon seeing the officer does not amount to a reasonable suspicion 
supports Rodriguez's argument. 
3 
of drug related activity warranting an investigatory stop"). 
In Johnson v. State, 610 So.2d 581 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 
1992), the court held that the officers did not have a reasonable 
suspicion to justify a level two detention in circumstances 
similar to those in the present case. In Johnson, the officer 
observed the defendant in a high drug area talking to another 
individual on a bike. When the individual on the bike saw the 
officer, he rode away. The officer observed what appeared to be 
cash in one of the defendant's hands. The officer also observed 
an object in the defendant's other hand. The defendant placed 
that object in his pocket. 
The court determined that the officer did not have a 
reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant because, among other 
things, the officer did not observe an exchange between the two 
individuals even though the officer had observed cash in the 
defendant's hand. The court indicated that the following factors 
did not support a reasonable suspicion: (1) "the flight of the 
unidentified bicyclist from an approaching officer, even in a 
crime area, does not itself give rise to a founded suspicion of 
criminal activity and does not justify a detention [citation 
omitted], especially where the person is detained as the result 
of a companion's flight. [citation omitted]"; (2) "a quick 
movement to conceal something is a legally insufficient reason to 
justify an investigatory stop"; (3) knowing that the defendant 
had a prior drug problem "did not raise a mere hunch to the level 
of founded suspicion"; and (4) "simply having cash in his hand 
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did not create a founded suspicion of criminal activity 
sufficient to warrant detention, as the officer observed no 
exchange of drugs, money, or anything else. [citations 
omitted].11 Johnson, 610 So.2d at 583-84 (emphasis added). 
The totality of the circumstances in the present case 
provide a less compelling basis for detention than did the facts 
in Johnson. The officer in this case did not testify that he had 
knowledge that Rodriguez had a drug problem or was a drug dealer. 
He saw only what appeared to be cash; he did not see any other 
object in Rodriguez's hand or that of the other individual. The 
other individual, not Rodriguez, had the cash which the officer 
observed. A comparison of the facts in this case with those in 
Johnson further demonstrates that the officer lacked a "founded 
suspicion" in this case. The holding in Johnson directly 
contradicts the State's position that the "crucial, additional 
fact justifying Officer Dailey's reasonable suspicion" was "the 
observation of the other man's producing a wad of bills, 
following a verbal exchange with defendant at close range." 
State's brief at 21. 
This court's opinion in State v. Sykes, 840 P.2d 825 
(Utah App. 1992), provides further guidance. In Sykes, this 
Court held that the officer lacked a reasonable suspicion to 
justify a detention where he observed Sykes enter a house which 
was under surveillance for drug activity and leave three minutes 
later. The officer was conducting surveillance on the house 
because neighbors had complained about frequent and extensive 
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traffic and suspicious activities, a confidential informant had 
provided information and the officer had made undercover drug 
purchases in the area. Although the officer had significant 
information about apparent drug transactions at the house, he did 
not have specific information creating a reasonable suspicion 
that Sykes had made a drug purchase. In the present case, 
Officer Dailey had less information than that which the officer 
in Sykes had. Dailey had no information about Rodriguez as a 
drug dealer or user. As was the situation in Sykes, the officer 
in this case did not have a reasonable articulable basis to 
detain the defendant. 
Cases cited by the State in which an appellate court held 
that an officer had a reasonable suspicion to justify a detention 
after witnessing an encounter in a high drug area contain 
circumstances in addition to those which exist in this case. For 
example, in Thornton v. State, 559 So.2d 438, 439 (Fla. App. 1 
Dist. 1990) (relied on by the State on pages 20-21 of its brief), 
in a high drug area the officer saw an individual peer "into 
appellant's hand which was 'outstretched in a cupped fashion.'" 
Thornton, 559 So.2d at 439. When Thornton saw the officer, he 
made a quick move and turned his back to the officer. The 
officer thought Thorton was secreting a weapon. The officer drew 
his weapon and asked Thornton to remove his hands. As Thornton 
removed his hands, a baggie containing cocaine fell to the 
ground. The court clarified that the circumstances in Thornton 
were distinguishable from those in Gipson because of "the 
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additional fact that when Officer Brown approached, appellant 
turned quickly and placed his hands in his groin area, a furtive, 
suspicious and potentially dangerous act" (emphasis added). 
Thornton, 559 So,2d at 439. Hence, a reasonable suspicion 
existed that Thornton was armed and dangerous, thereby justifying 
the officer's actions. 
In the present case, Rodriguez did not put anything in 
his pocket and there is no evidence that he did anything which 
suggested that he was armed and dangerous. While the officer did 
see the other man put the money back in his pocket, this action 
did not suggest that either party was armed and did not relate to 
Rodriguez. The actions taken by the officer in Thornton and the 
basis for those actions are distinct from the circumstances of 
this case. 
State v. Doleman, 1995 WL 339184 (Del. Super. April 21, 
1995) (cited by the State on page 21 of its brief) is 
distinguishable from the present case. The officer in Doleman 
observed the defendant and another man leaning into a stopped 
vehicle. When the two men saw the officer, they immediately 
walked away. The car drove away. The officer followed the pair 
around the block and observed the two men again leaning into the 
same car. When the men saw the officer, one of them again 
attempted to "surreptitiously withdraw between two houses." Id. 
at 1. The officer did not call for backup or detain Doleman 
until after he had observed Doleman and the other man depart when 
they saw the officer, then again make contact with the same 
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vehicle. Such recurring contact did not occur in this case. 
People v. Shaw, 596 N.Y.S.2d 832 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) 
(cited by the State on page 23 of its brief) is also 
distinguishable from the present case. In Shaw, the officer 
observed the defendant engage in four different transactions in a 
high drug area. The officer saw the defendant reach into a bag 
and deliver objects from the bag to others in exchange for cash. 
Each transaction took about thirty seconds. The last buyer fled 
when officers approached. In the present case, the officer 
observed only one encounter and did not observe an exchancre of an 
object for cash. 
Officer Dailey had no information that Rodriguez was 
involved with drugs. Dailey witnessed a single transaction in 
which no exchange of objects and money was made. Under the 
totality of the circumstances in this case, the officer did not 
have a reasonable suspicion justifying the detention.2 
2
 The State attempts to create a lesser standard for 
reasonable suspicion than that which is repeatedly espoused in case 
law by taking a statement in State v. Menke, 787 P. 2d 537, 541 
(Utah App. 1990), out of context. See State's brief at 12. The 
correct analysis to be applied in determining whether an officer 
had a reasonable suspicion justifying a detention is whether the 
officer had "a reasonable suspicion to believe [the individual] has 
committed or is in the act of committing a public offense." State 
v. Contrel, 886 P.2d 107 (UtahApp. 1994); State v. Svkes, 840 P.2d 
825 (UtahApp. 1992), citing State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 
(Utah 1987) ("a police officer may detain an individual if he or 
she has an articulable suspicion that criminal activity has 
occurred or is occurring"). Menke also utilizes this test. See 
Menke, 787 P.2d at 541. In State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133 (Utah 
App. 1991), this Court cites Menke, 787 P.2d at 541, for the 
proposition that "a level two stop requires a 'reasonable 
articulable suspicion' that defendant has committed or is about to 
commit a crime" (emphasis added). 
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B. THE CLAIMED CONSENT WAS NOT ATTENUATED FROM 
THE ILLEGAL DETENTION. 
Officer Dailey testified that he detained Rodriguez and 
the other man. R. 116. Another officer pulled up shortly 
thereafter, and the two officers talked with the pair. Dailey 
explained to Rodriguez what he had observed and what he "felt 
could be going on." R. 116. He told Rodriguez and the other man 
"that we were having a terrible problem with drug activity in the 
area and that I felt there was a drug transaction going on and 
that we were waiting for another officer to arrive." According 
to Officer Dailey, both men responded that they could be 
searched. R. 116. Rodriguez agreed, however, only to a search 
of the person and not a search of the bike. R. 128. Hence, the 
search of the bike exceeded the scope of any consent claimed by 
the State, and the search of the bike cannot be upheld based on a 
claim of consent. See State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 692 (Utah 
1990) . 
The State argues that " [b]ecause there was never an 
official request for consent to search, defendant cannot credibly 
argue that law enforcement exploited his alleged illegal 
detention." State's brief at 29. The State appears to rely on 
United States v. McCoy, 839 F.Supp. 1442 (D. Or. 1993), and 
Arroyo for this proposition. State's brief at 28. Neither case 
holds or otherwise indicates in dictum that in the absence of an 
official request to search, the exploitation analysis does not 
apply. Indeed, both cases demonstrate that the exploitation 
analysis applies regardless of whether a defendant voluntarily 
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consents to a search because of the taint caused by the prior 
illegality. The State does not cite any other cases which 
support this novel argument that the attenuation analysis 
required by Arroyo and Thurman does not apply where the officer 
does not make an express request for consent to search. 
Under the circumstances of the present case, the request 
to search was implicit. As the Utah Supreme Court recently 
recognized in State v. Hodson, No. 940053 (Utah November 30, 
1995), in some circumstances "[i]mplicit threats are as real as 
express verbal threats." Hodson, slip op. at 4. Implicit 
requests can also be as real as express requests, particularly in 
a situation such as the instant one where the officer had made it 
clear that he believed a drug transaction was occurring and that 
he intended to hold Rodriguez. If this Court were to adopt the 
State's rigid requirement that an express request is required in 
order to trigger the exploitation analysis, it would open the 
door to abusive police practices. Under such a rule, searches 
would be upheld where officers illegally detained individuals and 
implied that they would like to search, but refrained from saying 
the magic words. 
The State's analysis appears to equate the voluntariness 
prong of the consent inquiry with the exploitation inquiry. See 
State's brief at 27- 29. It is clear, however, that the two 
prongs present two distinct inquiries. Where a defendant 
voluntarily consents to a search, the evidence seized in the 
search may nevertheless be suppressed where the officers 
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exploited the primary illegality. See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 
1256 (Utah 1993). 
The exploitation analysis is required after police 
illegally detain an individual because of the concern that 
subsequently obtained evidence is tainted by the illegal police 
activity. In United States v. McCoy, 839 F. Supp. 1442 (D. Or. 
1993) (cited by the State on page 28 of its brief), the court 
stated: 
When consent to search is elicited and given 
following an illegal arrest, the consent to 
search is the result of the "chain of presumptive 
coercion." Because the illegal arrest triggers 
the exclusionary rule, the consent is tainted as 
part of the fruit of the poisonous tree," and the 
government must show that sufficient attenuation 
has occurred to free the consent from the taint. 
[citations omitted]. 
McCoy, 839 F.Supp. at 1445. Hence, the exploitation analysis is 
required regardless of whether officers expressly requested 
consent to search. 
In making its attenuation argument, the State disregards 
two of the three prongs of the attenuation analysis. While the 
State acknowledges in passing that the factors to be considered 
include the "'temporal proximity' of the illegality" and the 
"presence of intervening circumstances," it makes no factual 
analysis of these two factors. The State's failure to analyze 
two of the three Thurman/Arroyo exploitation factors is most 
likely due to the fact that both of those factors weigh heavily 
in favor of suppression. Indeed, the illegality occurred in 
extremely close temporal proximity to the alleged consent and no 
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intervening factors occurred. 
The State appears to be arguing that the purpose and 
flagrancy factor is the only factor which should be considered in 
determining whether the officers exploited the illegality. 
State's brief at 24-34. This is clearly not the case pursuant to 
Thurman and Arroyo. While the purpose and flagrancy factor is 
important, the lack of purposeful or flagrant police conduct does 
not end the inquiry. Indeed, Thurman suggests that while 
flagrant police conduct may weigh so heavily that the evidence 
must be suppressed regardless of temporal proximity of the 
illegality or the existence of intervening factors, it does not 
suggest the opposite--that the lack of flagrant police conduct 
ends the inquiry. Indeed, Thurman makes it clear that the 
temporal proximity and lack of intervening circumstances must be 
considered. In this case, the State has not established that 
intervening factors or the passage of time exist and attenuated 
the prior illegality from the claimed consent. 
The State argues that Officer Dailey's behavior was 
neither negligent nor intentional and therefore it was not 
flagrant. As Rodriguez argued in his opening brief at 20-21, the 
officer's conduct was purposeful and intentional. He 
acknowledged that he seized Rodriguez based on a hunch, even 
though case law makes it clear that individuals cannot be 
detained where an officer has a hunch rather than an articulable 
suspicion. The purpose of the detention was apparently to search 
for drugs. The officer's conduct therefore fits within the 
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purpose and flagrancy requirement. See Thurman, 846 P.2d at 
1264. 
The State's argument that the officer's actions were 
neither purposeful nor negligent misconstrues the meaning of 
those terms. An officer does not need malicious intent or actual 
knowledge that his behavior is unconstitutional in order to act 
in a purposeful or flagrant manner. Instead, actions aimed at 
obtaining a consent to search where the initial detention was 
illegal fall within this prong. In this case, where the officer 
acknowledged that he was acting on a hunch, the facts support 
that acknowledgement, and the purpose of the detention appears to 
be an attempt to search the individuals for drugs, the officer's 
actions were purposeful and flagrant. 
Pursuant to the State's argument in this case, any 
mistake by officers as to whether they were conducting a legal 
search would result in the search being upheld. Such a rule 
would completely eviscerate the important role played by the 
exploitation analysis in these cases. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Rodriguez respectfully 
requests that his convictions be reversed and the case remanded 
to the trial court for a new trial or dismissal. 
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SUBMITTED this ll-fe. day of December, 1995. 
<jk*- e cM/ 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
MARK R. MOFFAT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be 
delivered eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 
236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this /Hfl. day of 
December, 1995. 
<Tfa*o(>Yj\uY 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED this day of December, 1995 
14 
